Bristol City 1-2 Norwich City: Ben Lee's Canaries tactics

Ben is a City season ticket holder and author of the NCFC Analysis social media account, who unpicks Canaries' games with an analytical report highlighting tactical strengths and weaknesses.

This is what Ben made of a stirring finale at Ashton Gate, with Adam Idah to the rescue.

Bristol City versus Norwich: Respite, but questions remain

Score: 1 – 2

Possession (%): 61 – 39

Passes: 652 – 416

Shots: 15 – 12

xG: 1.13 – 1.14

• A new role for McLean.
• Norwich’s deep build-up play.
• Two touchline pressing traps.
• Exploiting Norwich’s pressing flaws.

Base formations

Following a week dominated by off-the-field matters, Wagner’s Norwich made the trip to the southwest to face Liam Manning’s Bristol City.

Bristol set up in a 3-4-3 base formation, but the hosts transitioned into a totally different shape out of possession.

Wagner’s visitors created their usual structures in every phase, but given the interchangeability of Barnes and Gibbs’ positions, their base formation could be described as more of a 4-4-2.

In what was a surprise to most, McLean started the game in place of Batth as Norwich’s left-sided centre-back.

As was confirmed by Wagner, the rationale behind this change was to support Norwich’s build-up play on the left; the interesting implications of such a change were twofold, but let’s return to that point later.

In Norwich’s deep build-up, Wagner’s men created their usual 4-2-4 structure, with Barnes (10) and Gibbs (8) dropping into their own half.

Out of possession, Bristol’s 3-4-3 base became a zonal 4-4-2. Knight (12) created a front two alongside Conway (15), while Tanner (19) occupied a conventional right-back position behind Weimann (14).

Gunn (28) frequently attempted to bait Conway (15) and Knight (12) to press which, given Norwich’s first-line 3v2 advantage, would have left a centre-back free.

Instead, Bristol’s front line stayed in the space ahead of Norwich’s double pivot, while James (6) and Gardner-Hickman (22) occupied the space between the midfield and forward lines.

By creating a back four out of possession, Bristol created a 4v4 in the last line, with Dickie (16) and Vyner (26) ready to step into midfield to track Barnes (10) and Gibbs (8), respectively.

Once Gunn (28) played out to the centre-backs, Bristol attempted to trap Norwich against the touchline with a ball-side man-to-man press. Norwich primarily resorted to escaping Bristol’s press via long passes rather than by playing through pressure with control.

On occasion, however, Norwich escaped around the outside of Bristol’s press, most notably towards the end of the first half, when McLean (23), Giannoulis (30), and Hernandez (25) were the beneficiaries of mistimed Bristol City jumps. It was in these situations that McLean’s deeper role became advantageous.

In settled possession, Nunez (26) frequently occupied McLean’s (23) usual position between the centre-backs, with Sara (17) becoming a situational single pivot.

In these phases, Norwich’s wingers inverted while the full-backs overlapped to provide the width. Barnes (10) and Gibbs (8) alternately occupied deeper positions, either at the tip of a midfield diamond or in the half spaces alongside the inverting wingers.

Bristol City maintained their zonal 4-4-2 shape, leaving Norwich’s forwards and wingers in space between the lines – space the visitors could have exploited with more regularity.

In Bristol’s deep build-up phases, the hosts created an asymmetric 3-4-2-1 shape as Vyner (26) and Dickie (16) dropped either side of O’Leary (1), while Pring (3) moved towards the left touchline. Weimann (14) and Knight (12) occupied the half spaces ahead of the double pivot.

In response, Norwich created their usual 4-1-3-2 high pressing structure. Nunez (26) and Sara (17) alternately occupied the space between the narrow Norwich wingers, with the latter predominantly in the deeper midfield position.

With Sara (17) initially overloaded by Weimann (14) and Knight (12), the full-backs stayed tight to the Bristol attacking midfielders, while the wingers were responsible for the wide players.

Like Bristol, Wagner’s men attempted to execute a man-to-man touchline pressing trap. But throughout Sunday’s game, the hosts built-up with more success than the visitors, particularly on their left.

The hosts frequently manipulated Norwich’s press through small, but significant, build-up variations.

Pring (3) often moved out to the left touchline where he was pressed by Rowe (27). With Knight (12) pinning Stacey (3) on the halfway line, Sara (17) was forced to track Sykes (17). Knight (12) would then drop back into space to receive from the left.

As was the case in the build-up to their goal, Bristol City exploited the 2v1 advantage created by the midfielders on either side of Sara (17). With Sykes (17) pinning Stacey (3), and Pring (3) drawing Rowe (27) to press, this overload was exploited further.

Norwich’s structure also became problematic in settled possession. Unlike in the host’s deep build-up, Pring (3) occupied the left half space rather than the wide channel.

As a result, pressure applied by Rowe (27) now failed to create an effective touchline trap; instead, with Sara (17) too far away to support the press and Stacey (3) pinned back by Knight (12), Sykes (17) was left free on the touchline.

Once Bristol City had escaped Norwich’s high press by creating an overload on the ball-side, they were quick to move the ball across to the opposite flank, completing a pattern known as ‘overloading to isolate’. This was an attempt to access the far-side 2v1 conceded by Norwich’s ball-side pressing trap.

Yet another pressing flaw was exposed when Norwich’s front two were drawn to press the Bristol City back three; their failure to block passing lanes to James (6) and Gardner-Hickman (22) left The Robins’ double pivot easily accessible in a 2v1 against Nunez (26).

When dropping deep into their own half, Wagner’s Norwich transitioned into a 4-4-2 shape, while Bristol City created a 3-2-4-1. The visitors’ lack of man-orientation meant Knight (12) and Weimann (14) were often free and accessible between the lines.

When they weren’t accessible, positional interchanges between the wide players and attacking midfielders meant Knight (12) or Weimann (14) could drop to the side of Norwich’s pressing block to receive from the centre-backs.

Aside from the persisting tactical flaws, both in and out of possession, a positive result had become somewhat of a necessity for Norwich following a turbulent week off the field.

Before a ball had been kicked, however, there was a personnel switch reflecting two notable concerns: one tactical and the other regarding recruitment.

Norwich’s proficiency in deep build-up situations contributed to much of their early season success; but this success has scarcely transpired since, with centre-backs frequently playing into pressing traps, going long, and conceding unnecessary turnovers.

Perhaps, given the lack of aerial threat provided by Bristol, Wagner saw Sunday as an appropriate opportunity to support Norwich’s build-up. He did so by starting McLean as a centre-back: a significant position for a team attempting to bait pressure.

But beyond any understandable tactical or technical rationale for the decision is the notion that, for player profiling reasons, Wagner felt the need to start a midfielder at centre-back. Whatever happened to signing players who meet the demands of their position within a system?

The long-term sustainability of recent results will be dependent on Wagner finding solutions to multiple tactical deficiencies, but Sunday’s win provides a degree of respite for Wagner and the fanbase, even if only temporarily.

You can read all Ben's previous analysis of Norwich City games via his social media accounts.

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